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 NOTE 
Endangering Missouri’s Captive Cervid 
Industry 
Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) 
Lauren Hunter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a crisp autumn morning just after the break of dawn.  A young 
hunter sits silently, waiting and watching, basking in the subtle sunlight sere-
nading across the Missouri landscape.  Out of the corner of her eye, she sees it 
– a beautiful ten-point buck slipping slowly into view.  Steadily, she takes aim 
as the beast strolls perfectly between her sights.  With a flash, the creature falls 
and adrenaline pulsates through the young hunter’s veins.  Each hunting sea-
son, these exhilarating experiences are facilitated by captive cervid1 breeders 
like Donald Hill, co-owner of Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch.2  However, with 
new, demanding regulations promulgated by the Missouri Conservation Com-
mission (“Commission”)3, Hill now finds his business caught between the 
crosshairs. 
This Note seeks to explore the validity of regulations proposed by the 
Commission to prevent the spread of chronic wasting disease (“CWD”) – a 
fatal neurodegenerative disease – in cervids, such as white-tailed deer.  Part II 
discusses the facts and circumstances surrounding the Missouri Supreme 
 
* B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2020; Associate Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2019–
2020.  I am grateful to Professor Alexander for her insight, guidance, and support dur-
ing the writing of this Note. 
 1. Cervids are hoofed mammals in the family cervidae, whose males typically 
grow antlers that shed annually.  Hill v. Mo. Conservation Comm’n, No. 15OS-
CC00005-01, 2016 WL 8814770, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Gasconade Cty. Nov. 17, 2016), 
rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en 
banc).  “White-tailed deer and elk are examples of cervids” that are native to Missouri.  
Id. 
 2. See id. 
 3. The Commission is a four-member board whose members are appointed by 
the governor to serve six-year terms.  Conservation Commission, MO. DEP’T OF 
CONSERVATION, https://mdc.mo.gov/about-us/conservation-commission (last visited 
Jun. 1, 2019).  The Commission is responsible for appointing the Director of the Mis-
souri Department of Conservation, serving as policymakers, approving wildlife code 
regulations, developing the budget, and making major expenditure decisions.  Id. 
1
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Court’s decision in Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation.4  Part III dis-
sects the delicate balance between private property interests and government 
interests, the scope of the Commission’s regulatory authority, as well as the 
driving forces behind the “right-to-farm” amendment to the Missouri Consti-
tution.  Part IV unpacks the court’s reasoning in Hill before concluding with a 
discussion on the implications of the court’s holdings on private property 
rights, the regulatory authority of the Commission, and the interpretation of the 
right-to-farm amendment. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Donald Hill and his co-plaintiffs, Travis Broadway, Kevin Grace, and 
Whitetail Sales and Service, LLC (hereinafter “Breeders”), each participate in 
the selective breeding of captive cervids, such as white-tail deer and elk.5  In 
October of 2014, the Commission began amending its regulations to impose 
stricter standards on the captive cervid industry.6  Shortly after the Commis-
sion’s regulations were approved and took effect, the Breeders sued to enjoin 
the Commission from enforcing its regulations.7  The Breeders asserted that 
the new, more stringent regulations would prevent them from successfully op-
erating their businesses and violate their right to farm as granted to them in the 
Missouri Constitution.8  Furthermore, the Breeders argued that these regula-
tions fell outside the scope of the Commission’s regulatory authority.9  In re-
sponse to the Breeders’ lawsuit, the Commission contended that regulating the 
captive cervid industry did fall within its regulatory authority,10 and, moreover, 
its stricter regulations on cervid breeding facilities were vital to preventing the 
spread of CWD.11 
CWD is a fatal neurodegenerative disease that infects cervids, such as 
white-tailed deer.12  Symptoms of CWD have been likened to mad cow disease, 
and the two infections are part of the same family.13  Infecting its victims 
through contact with proteins – known as prions – the disease can be passed 
directly through animal-to-animal contact or indirectly through environmental 
 
 4. 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 5. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *1. 
 6. Id. at *6. 
 7. Id. at *2. 
 8. Id. at *2–3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at *3. 
 11. Id. at *6. 
 12. Brief of Appellants Missouri Conservation Commission, Missouri Department 
of Conservation, James Blair, David Murphy, Marilynn Bradford, & Don Bedell at 12, 
Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, No. ED 105042, 2017 WL 4507991 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Oct. 10, 2017), transferred to 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), 2017 WL 1534985 
[hereinafter Brief of Appellants]. 
 13. Id. 
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contact with plants, water, and other matter.14  The disease has an eighteen-
month incubation period between initial infection and initial symptoms, and 
there are no methods of testing animals for the disease while they are still 
alive.15  Even if a live test for CWD became available, no cure or vaccination 
for the disease has yet been discovered or developed.16  All these factors make 
CWD incredibly contagious and particularly difficult to contain.17 
The increased density of animals in captive cervid facilities increases the 
risk of CWD transmission.18  Recognizing this risk and attempting to minimize 
it, the Missouri Department of Agriculture (“MDA”) began regulating captive 
cervid facilities pursuant to its authority under the Missouri Livestock Disease 
Control and Eradication Law (“MLDCEL”).19  These regulations state that cap-
tive cervids cannot enter Missouri if they come from a herd that has tested 
positive for CWD within the previous five years or if they originate from an 
area where CWD has been reported in the previous five years.20  The MDA 
also requires individual identification through ear tagging, strict veterinary rec-
ords, and enrollment in the CWD program for all captive cervids over one year 
old.21  To move within the State of Missouri, captive cervids must meet a CWD 
status standard, and any herds suspected of contracting CWD must be quaran-
tined.22  “In 2013, the [MDA]’s CWD-monitoring program was [named ]an 
‘Approved State Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program’ by the 
United States Department of Agriculture [(“USDA”)].”23 
On October 17, 2014, the Commission proposed a handful of amend-
ments to regulations directed at the farmed-cervid industry in an attempt to 
manage the spread of CWD in the Missouri cervid population.24  The Commis-
sion’s proposed amendments were approved and took effect on January 30, 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 16. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 18. 
 18. Id. at 19. 
 19. Hill v. Mo. Conservation Comm’n, No. 15OS-CC00005-01, 2016 WL 
8814770, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Gasconade Cty. Nov. 17, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. 
Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 20. Id.; see also MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 2, § 30-2.010(10)(E)(1) (2018) (stating 
captive cervids will not be allowed to enter Missouri if the cervid originated from an 
area with reported CWD and from a captive herd that has tested CWD-positive within 
last five years). 
 21. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *3; see also MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 2, § 30-
2.020(6)(A) (requiring official ear tags). 
 22. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *3; see also MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 2, § 30-
2.020(6)(D) (mandating enrollment in a CWD program). 
 23. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *3. 
 24. Id. at *6. 
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2015.25  The changes to the regulations included clarifying that the Commis-
sion’s regulations extended to “wildlife raised or held in captivity”;26 defining 
“Class I Wildlife” to include white-tailed deer, white-tailed deer hybrids, mule 
deer, and mule deer hybrids and imposing fencing and confinement require-
ments on said wildlife class;27 imposing new fencing requirements for captive 
cervid facilities;28 imposing veterinary-testing, record-keeping, and reporting 
requirements on hunting preserves;29 and prohibiting out-of-state cervids from 
being shipped to breeding facilities or held on hunting preserves.30 
As participants in the captive cervid industry,31 the Breeders are all too 
familiar with the threat that CWD poses to their herds.32  With cervid herds 
collectively worth millions of dollars, the Breeders’ all have a significant in-
terest in keeping their cervids healthy.33  The Breeders’ cervids are born and 
bred in captivity and are held on private property in enclosed hunting preserves 
or breeding facilities throughout their lives.34  All new cervids that enter the 
Breeders’ properties are purchased from other captive cervid owners.35  Much 
like other domesticated animals, the Breeders’ cervids are bred naturally or 
through artificial insemination and are bought, sold, or auctioned to other pri-
vate breeding facilities and hunting preserves.36  To successfully run their busi-
nesses, the Breeders rely on their ability to selectively breed white-tailed deer 
and elk, promoting desirable characteristics, such as large antler racks.37  Se-
lective breeding largely depends on the importation of live breeding stock 
 
 25. Id. at *2. 
 26. Id. § 10-4.110(1) (establishing the scope of regulation). 
 27. Id. § 10-9.220(2)(R) (table) (listing Class I wildlife by establishing their en-
closure requirements). 
 28. Id. § 10-9.220(3) (defining fencing and enclosure requirements for cervids). 
 29. Id. § 10-9.565(1)(B) (mandating requirements for hunting preserves); id. § 10-
9.566 (2015) (establishing record requirements for hunting preserves). 
 30. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *6–7; MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 3, § 10-9.353(2) 
(“[L]ive white-tailed deer, white-tailed deer-hybrids, mule deer, mule deer-hybrids, 
raccoons, foxes, and coyotes may not be imported . . . .”); id. § 10-9.565(1)(B)(9) (pro-
hibiting imported cervids to be held in a licensed big game hunting preserve). 
 31. “Donald Hill is the co-owner of Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, LLC, . . . a 1,300-
acre hunting preserve and [w]hite-tailed deer breeding facility” with a deer herd valued 
at approximately $6.45 million.  Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *1.  “Travis Broadway is 
the owner of Winter Quarters Wildlife Ranch LLC, . . . [a] 3,000-acre hunting preserve” 
and lodge offering three-day guided hunts for deer and elk with revenues based on the 
size of the animal taken.  Id.  Kevin Grace is the owner of Whitetail Sales and Service, 
LLC, a business formed to broker transactions between breeding operations and hunt-
ing preserves, breed deer, and organize annual captive-cervid auctions.  Id. 
 32. See id. at *5. 
 33. See id. at *2. 
 34. Id. at *8. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at *1. 
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sourced from out-of-state breeding facilities;38 however, the Commission’s up-
dated regulations prohibit the importation of live cervids from outside the state, 
thus endangering the Breeders’ selective breeding stock.39  Without the ability 
to import and hold captive cervids from outside the state, the Breeders will be 
unable to meet customer demand for “trophy” bucks.40 
Because of the threat the Commission’s regulations posed to their busi-
nesses, the Breeders sued to enjoin the Commission from enforcing its regula-
tions.41  The Breeders argued that the regulations were invalid because the an-
imals at issue did not fall within the scope of the Commission’s regulating au-
thority as defined under article IV, section 40(a) of the Missouri Constitution.42  
Furthermore, the Breeders asserted that the regulations inhibited their funda-
mental right to engage in farming and ranching practices as granted by article 
I, section 35 of the Missouri Constitution, also known as the right-to-farm 
amendment.43  The Breeders maintained that if the Commission’s regulations 
were enforced, they would face irreparable harm, including significant loss of 
business and potentially bankruptcy.44 
The Commission countered that even though the Breeders’ operations 
were privately owned, involved privately bred cervids enclosed on private 
property, and were already subject to the regulation of the MDA, the cervids 
were still wild by nature and were thus “game” and “wildlife” subject to the 
regulation of the Commission.45  As to the Breeders’ assertion that the regula-
tions violated their right to farm, the Commission argued that the right-to-farm 
amendment did not apply to the Breeders because they were not engaged in 
farming or ranching practices.46 
After the Breeders requested a preliminary injunction, the court held an 
initial hearing on July 23, 2015.47  On August 13, 2015, the Circuit Court of 
 
 38. Id. at *9–10. 
 39. Id. at *1. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *2. 
 42. Id. at *2, *18; see also MO. CONST. art. IV, § 40(a) (“The control, management, 
restoration, conservation and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife 
resources of the state, including hatcheries, sanctuaries, refuges, reservations and all 
other property owned, acquired or used for such purposes and the acquisition and es-
tablishment thereof, and the administration of all laws pertaining thereto, shall be 
vested in a conservation commission . . . .”). 
 43. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *18; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“That agri-
culture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and security is the foundation and 
stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s econ-
omy, the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall 
be forever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, conferred 
by article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.”). 
 44. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *16–17. 
 45. Id. at *12. 
 46. Id. at *18–19. 
 47. Id. at *2. 
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Gasconade County, the Honorable Judge Robert D. Schollmeyer presiding, 
granted the Breeders’ request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the 
Breeders had demonstrated a probability of success on the merits.48  A second 
hearing on the full merits of both counts was held on June 8, 2016.49  After the 
second hearing, the court found in favor of the Breeders, declaring the regula-
tions imposed by the Commission invalid and granting the request for a per-
manent injunction.50 
The Commission appealed the circuit court’s decision on both counts.51  
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District heard the appeal.52  For 
its first point on appeal, the Commission claimed the circuit court erred in find-
ing that the regulations at issue were not authorized under the Missouri Con-
stitution.53  More specifically, the Commission argued that it was error to con-
clude that privately owned animals were neither game, wildlife, nor a resource 
of the state as defined under article IV, section 40(a).54  On its second point, 
the Commission argued that the circuit court erred in holding that the regula-
tions inhibited the Breeders’ right to farm as granted by article I, section 35.55  
The Eastern District affirmed the circuit court’s findings as to count one and 
two but requested transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court based on the signif-
icant state interests at stake in the matter.56 
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer and heard oral arguments 
on January 10, 2018.57  On July 3, 2018, the Missouri Supreme Court handed 
down a unanimous decision that reversed the circuit court’s judgment in favor 
of the Breeders and entered judgment in favor of the Commission on all 
counts.58  Judge Paul C. Wilson delivered the opinion of the court, holding that 
captive cervids were “game” and “wildlife” subject to the regulatory authority 
of the Commission and that the Breeders were not engaged in “farming [or] 
ranching practice” for purposes of the right-to-farm amendment of the Missouri 
Constitution.59  Thus, the court held the Commission’s regulations did not in-
fringe upon the Breeders’ rights.60 
 
 48. Id. at *2, *12. 
 49. Id. at *2. 
 50. Id. at *22. 
 51. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, No. ED 105042, 2017 WL 4507991, at *1 
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017), transferred to 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 52. Id. at *3. 
 53. Id.; see also MO. CONST. art. IV, § 40(a). 
 54. Hill, 2017 WL 4507991, at *4–5. 
 55. Id. at *3. 
 56. Id. at *7, *9. 
 57. See Case Summaries for January 10, 2018, MO. COURTS, 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=119841 (last visited June 4, 2019). 
 58. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d 463, 474 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 59. Id. at 472–74. 
 60. Id. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part explores the history of private property rights in animals, the 
protections on those rights, and the remedies when those rights are infringed 
upon.  Section A discusses the power of the federal and state judiciary to review 
the actions of executive agencies through the use of regulatory taking analysis 
and defining the scope of regulatory power.  Section B concludes this Part with 
a brief history and discussion of the right-to-farm movement that led Missouri 
to add the right-to-farm amendment to its Constitution. 
A. Judicial Review of Agency Actions 
Protecting property rights was a foundational concept in establishing the 
American system of governance.61  In most circumstances, animals fall within 
the category of personal property; therefore, the right of an individual to own 
and use animals also warrants protection.62  However, when the government 
has a public interest in regulation, oftentimes private property rights are inhib-
ited.63  To check this power, courts may exercise judicial review over agency 
actions.64  This Section explores two situations in which the court may overturn 
a challenged regulation: when a regulation constitutes a regulatory taking un-
der the Fifth Amendment and when a regulation exceeds the scope of an 
agency’s regulatory authority. 
1. Balancing Private Property Rights and Regulatory Interests 
Property rights are said to be an integral part of any civilization.65  Some 
scholars suggest that property rights should be held in equal regard with liberty 
rights.66  Recognizing the importance of private property, the framers incorpo-
rated property protections into the U.S. Constitution in the form of the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.67  The Takings Clause, which states that “pri-
vate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation,”68 
taken together with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
 
 61. See James L. Huffman, The Public Interest in Private Property Rights, 50 
OKLA. L. REV. 377, 381 (1997). 
 62. See David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal 
System, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1050 (2010). 
 63. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005) (outlining 
regulatory takings jurisprudence). 
 64. See Huffman, supra note 61, at 382–83. 
 65. Fred H. Blume, Human Rights and Property Rights, 64 U.S. L. REV. 581, 581 
(1930). 
 66. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L. J. 555, 
555–56 (1997). 
 67. Huffman, supra note 61, at 381; Favre, supra note 62, at 1025; see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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which prohibits the states from denying life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law, creates a limit on both federal and state governments.69  While 
the plain meaning of these clauses appears to apply only to the physical seizure 
of private property, United States Supreme Court jurisprudence interprets the 
meaning of  the Takings Clause to include a prohibition against regulatory tak-
ings as well.70  In other words, statutes and regulations that restrict the use or 
decrease the value of property without just compensation may amount to a con-
stitutional violation. 
Three categories of property exist: real property, personal property, and 
intellectual property.71  From this perspective, animals are categorized as per-
sonal property, defined as physical, moveable, or with a limited physical exist-
ence.72  Under English common law, however, not all animals earned such sta-
tus.73  While “useful” animals, such as cattle and sheep, were given the most 
protections under property law, animals ferae naturae – of a wild nature – were 
given little to no protection at all.74  This distinction was largely based on per-
ceived economic value.75  Work animals and livestock, such as horses and cat-
tle, were thought to provide an inherent value to their owners that wild animals 
did not.76  American jurisprudence puts less emphasis on an animal’s useful-
ness as a justification for property protections.77  Instead, animals are consid-
ered personal property if they are tame, domesticated, or reduced to possession 
by either kill or capture.78  The domesticated animal distinction has been held 
to include more than traditional farm animals such as cattle, swine, chickens, 
and horse.79  For example, white-tailed deer bred and raised in captivity have 
 
 69. Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 888–89 (2001). 
 70. Id. at 885–86. 
 71. Favre, supra note 62, at 1025. 
 72. Id. at 1026. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1027. 
 76. Id. at 1026. 
 77. See id. at 1027–28. 
 78. On Property in Animals, 3 JURIST 403, 404 (1832). 
 79. Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, L.L.C. v. Lange, 326 S.W.3d 549, 550 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
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frequently been recognized as domesticated animals for the purposes of defin-
ing the deer as personal property.80  Therefore, most animals kept on a person’s 
property warrant private property protections.81 
The balance between the constitutional protection of private property and 
the government’s interest in protecting the public good has always been a del-
icate one.82  In recent years, claimants challenging the constitutionality of stat-
utes and regulations that infringe upon their property rights often fail.83  While 
such claimants assert that their economic interests are being jeopardized, the 
government’s pursuit of some social or economic purpose is perceived as war-
ranting judicial deference.84  In deciding whether a regulation constitutes a vi-
olation of the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court weighs various factors, in-
cluding whether the “government regulation amount[s] to a physical confisca-
tion,” whether the regulation “leave[s] the property owner with [an] economi-
cally viable use of the property,” whether “the benefits of the regulation out-
weigh the detriment to the property owner,” and whether “the regulation [is] 
necessary to effect a substantial public purpose.”85 
This delicate balance becomes particularly clear when environmental reg-
ulations come head to head with private property rights.86  In his exploration 
of this issue, Professor James Huffman explains that environmental regulation 
presumes that private property owners are the cause of environmental harm: 
“[P]rivate property and other forms of private economic rights are exercised by 
self-interested, even if well intentioned, individuals in ways which do not take 
account of most environmental consequences.”87  Therefore, executive agen-
cies that promulgate environmental regulations often inhibit private property 
rights.88  Ensuring that the decisions of executive agencies do not infringe too 
far into private property rights is one reason why the decisions of all executive 
agencies are subject to judicial review. 
 
 80. See, e.g., State v. Hudnall, 480 So. 2d 933, 936 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (“A person 
of ordinary intelligence would understand that a “domesticated deer” includes a 
tamed deer raised as a pet in a pen behind someone’s home, such as in the present 
case.”); State v. Lee, 41 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1949) (“These wild animals are not sub-
ject to private ownership so long as they remain wild and unconfined, but such animals 
become property when removed from their natural liberty and made the subject of 
man’s dominion. It will be observed that animals ferae naturae become property, and 
entitled to protection as such, when the owner has them in his actual possession, cus-
tody or control and usually this is accomplished by taming, domesticating or confining 
them.”); Dieterich v. Fargo, 194 N.Y. 359, 364–65 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1909) (“Deer, though 
strictly speaking ferae naturae, kept in inclose [sic] ground, are the subject of property, 
pass to the executors, and are liable to be taken in distress.”). 
 81. Huffman, supra note 61, at 381–82. 
 82. Huffman, supra note 61, at 381–82. 
 83. See id. at 383. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Tunick, supra note 69, at 885–86. 
 86. Huffman, supra note 61, at 382. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 382. 
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2. Maintaining the Scope of Regulatory Authority 
Courts can also exercise a check on executive agencies by issuing opin-
ions on the validity of challenged regulations.  Under section 536.050 of the 
Missouri Revised Statutes, Missouri courts are granted the authority to render 
declaratory judgments against state agencies regarding the validity of rules and 
regulations promulgated by said agencies.89  When deciding the validity of a 
state agency’s regulation, the court first looks to the agency’s enabling statute90 
to determine whether the regulation in question falls within the delegated au-
thority of the state agency.91  “Rules are void if they are beyond the scope of 
the legislative authority conferred upon the state agency or if they attempt to 
expand or modify the statutes.”92  Regulations will be sustained unless they are 
found to be unreasonably or clearly inconsistent with the agency’s enabling 
statute.93  The court will construe the enabling statute “in light of the purposes 
the legislature intended to accomplish and the evils it intended to cure.”94  To 
give effect to the statute as written, statutory language is generally taken at its 
plain and ordinary meaning.95  The court presumes that the legislature intended 
the logical results of a statute’s particular wording and phrasing.96 
In Missouri Hospital Association v. Missouri Department of Consumer 
Affairs, the court held that certain rules imposed by the Missouri State Board 
of Pharmacy (“Board”) were void and that the Board had no authority to create 
rules and regulations relating to in-hospital dispensing of drugs.97  In reaching 
its decision, the court first looked to the Missouri statute establishing the 
Board.98  The court found that chapter 338 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 
 
 89. MO. REV. STAT. § 536.050 (2018) (“The power of the courts of this state to 
render declaratory judgments shall extend to declaratory judgments respecting the va-
lidity of rules, or of threatened applications thereof, and such suits may be maintained 
against agencies whether or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon 
the question presented.”). 
 90. An enabling statute is a statute that delegates powers or creates new powers.  
Enabling Statute Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.usle-
gal.com/e/enabling-statute/ (last visited June 4, 2019).  For example, a congressional 
statute is an enabling statute when it confers powers on executive agencies to carry out 
various delegated tasks.  Id. 
 91. Brown v. Melahn, 824 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc) (citing 
Osage Outdoor Advert. v. State Highway Comm’n, 624 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981)). 
 92. Mo. Hosp. Ass’n v. Mo. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 731 S.W.2d 262, 264 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Stewart, 520 S.W.2d 1 
(Mo. 1975) (en banc)). 
 93. Brown, 824 S.W.2d at 933 (citing Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Davis, 488 
S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. 1972) (en banc)). 
 94. Id. (citing In re A.M.B., 738 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 95. Id. (citing Moyer v. Walker, 771 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 96. Id. at 933–34. 
 97. 731 S.W.2d at 265. 
 98. Id. at 263. 
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was designed to regulate pharmacies dispensing drugs to the general public, 
not hospital pharmaceutical services.99  As further evidence that the Board did 
not have regulatory authority over hospital pharmaceuticals, the court pointed 
to the Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Health, another 
state agency that was granted the authority over hospitals under the Hospital 
Licensing Law.100  The court noted that the Hospital Licensing Law, passed 
subsequent to the pharmacy regulatory statutes, provided for the regulation of 
hospitals, including pharmaceutical services, by the Division of Health.101 
Like in Missouri Hospital Association, in Hill, the Missouri Supreme 
Court explored the scope of two agencies: the Commission and the MDA.102  
The Commission was established in 1936.103  The responsibilities of the Com-
mission are addressed in article IV, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution and 
include “[t]he control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation 
of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state.”104 
As to the Commission’s regulatory authority relating to captive cervids, 
in State v. Weber, the court held that deer raised in captivity are “game” for the 
purposes of the Commission’s enabling statute.105  The Weber court reasoned 
that the term “game” encompassed all deer both tame and wild, free and re-
duced to captivity, as “game” means wild by nature.106  The Commission has 
promulgated regulations surrounding big game hunting preserves since 
1973.107  In 1985, the Commission began permitting such preserves to include 
captive white-tailed deer.108 
By contrast, the MDA regulates captive cervids pursuant to its authority 
under the MLDCEL.109  The MLDCEL, enacted in 1959, gave the MDA the 
power to regulate the entry of animals into Missouri and the movement of ani-
mals throughout Missouri.110  For purposes of the MLDCEL, “animal” is de-
fined as “an animal of the equine, bovine, porcine, ovine, caprine, or species 
domesticated or semidomesticated.”111  “Semidomesticated” is defined as “a 
captive state (as on a fur or game farm or in a zoo) of a wild animal in which 
its living conditions and often its breeding are controlled and its products or 
 
 99. Id. at 264. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 103. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 12, at 40. 
 104. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 40(a) (emphasis added). 
 105. 102 S.W. 955, 956 (Mo. 1907). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Brief of Appellants, supra note 12, at 9. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Hill v. Mo. Conservation Comm’n, No. 15OS-CC00005-01, 2016 WL 
8814770, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 17, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conser-
vation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 110. MO. REV. STAT. § 267.560 (2016). 
 111. Id. § 267.565(2). 
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services used by man.”112  Because captive cervids fall within that definition, 
the MDA has several regulations governing the inter and intra state movement 
of cervids and requiring disease-testing.113 
To explain the differences between the two agencies, Missouri Depart-
ment of Conservation Deputy Director Tom Draper said “The [Missouri] De-
partment of Agriculture has the regulatory responsibility of overseeing disease 
issues and inter and intra state movement associated with captive cervids.  The 
[Missouri] Department of Conservation is responsible for the permitting of 
hunting preserves.”114 
B. Article I, Section 35 of the Missouri Constitution: The Right to 
Farm 
In 2014, Missouri placed a constitutional amendment on the ballot guar-
anteeing Missourians the right to engage in farming and ranching practices.115  
The provision, known colloquially as the right-to-farm amendment, was 
adopted by a narrow margin.116  The amendment, article I, section 35 of the 
Missouri Constitution, reads in whole: 
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and se-
curity is the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  
To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers 
and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall be for-
ever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, 
conferred by article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.117 
The proposal of the amendment was a response to “Proposition B,” an 
initiative backed by the U.S. Humane Society and passed in 2010.118  Proposi-
tion B imposed stricter regulations on dog breeders in an attempt to stop pro-
prietors of “puppy mills.”119  While right-to-farm movements in many states 
were proposed as initiatives to protect citizens engaged in farming and ranch-
ing practices from nuisance suits, Missouri already protected farmers from nui-
sance actions prior to the proposal of the right-to-farm amendment.120  Instead, 
supporters of the right-to-farm amendment suggested that it would provide 
much-needed protection for farmers from regulations pushed by well-funded 
 
 112. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *8. 
 113. Id. at *2–3. 
 114. Id. at *3 (alterations in original). 
 115. Missouri Right-to-Farm, Amendment 1 (August 2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Right-to-Farm,_Amendment_1_(August_2014) (last 
visited June 4, 2019) [hereinafter Right-to-Farm]. 
 116. Id. 
 117. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
 118. Right-to-Farm, supra note 115. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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environmental and animal rights groups.121  With the broad language of the 
amendment, scholars like Professor Erin Hawley predicted that the true mean-
ing and effect of the right-to-farm amendment would have to be determined by 
the courts.122  Hill provided the first meaningful opportunity for the court to 
interpret the right-to-farm amendment. 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Missouri Supreme Court, with Judge Paul C. Wilson writing for the 
unanimous court, agreed with the Commission that the Breeders’ cervids were 
“game” and “wildlife” under article IV, section 40(a) of the Missouri Consti-
tution, making the captive cervids subject to the Commission’s authority.123  
The court rejected the Breeders’ assertion that “wildlife” means both wild by 
nature and never tamed or domesticated.124  The court first utilized a plain 
meaning analysis, which pointed in favor of the inclusion of all animals that 
are wild by nature in the definition of game and wildlife.125  Next, the court 
turned to historical context and found that prior to the adoption of article IV, 
section 40(a), “game” included “species both wild by nature and generally pur-
sued for food, sport, or other lawful ends.”126  Finally, the court looked to prec-
edent and found that, in State v. Weber, deer “fawned and raised in captivity” 
were defined as “game.”127  The court concluded that, as used in article IV, 
section 40(a), “wildlife” means species that are wild by nature and “game” 
means wildlife species that are often pursued for sport, food, or other lawful 
ends.128  Therefore, the court held that the Commission acted appropriately un-
der its authority when it proposed the regulations in question.129 
The court then agreed with the Commission’s assertion that the Breeders’ 
cervids were game and wildlife resources of the state.130  The Breeders sug-
gested that game and wildlife were resources of the state only when they were 
in the wild, but the court maintained that this was not what Missouri voters 
believed when approving article IV, section 40(a).131  The court compared 
“wildlife resources of Missouri” to “the mountains of Wyoming” or “the lakes 
 
 121. See Right-to-Farm, supra note 115. 
 122. Kristofor Husted, Missouri Constitutional Amendment Pits Farmer Against 
Farmer, NPR (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/the-
salt/2014/08/06/338127707/missouri-s-right-to-farm-amendment-pits-farmer-against-
farmer. 
 123. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d 463, 473 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 124. Id. at 467–69. 
 125. Id. at 468–69. 
 126. Id. at 469. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 470–71. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 472. 
 131. Id. 
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of Minnesota.”132  When people say these things, they do not mean that the 
state owns these resources, but rather that these are resources inside the geo-
graphical boundaries of the state.133 
Finally, agreeing with the Commission once again, the court held that the 
Breeders were not engaged in farming or ranching practice for the purposes of 
the right-to-farm amendment, and therefore, the Commission’s regulations 
were not infringing on the Breeders’ rights.134  The Breeders had the burden to 
prove the regulations clearly and undoubtedly violated article I, section 35.135  
The court found that the Breeders failed to meet that threshold.136  The court 
reasoned that “nothing in the language of article I, section 35, suggests it was 
intended to limit the Commission’s constitutional authority under article IV, 
section 40(a), to regulate [the Breeders’] captive cervids as ‘wildlife’ and 
‘game’ resources of this state.”137  Furthermore, the court pointed out that cap-
tive cervid operations have been regulated by statutes and regulations for al-
most a century.138  Based on this history, the court concluded that it was un-
likely that Missouri voters intended to “overthrow this longstanding regulatory 
pattern by adopting article I, section 35.”139 
V. COMMENT 
The decision in Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation has several 
significant implications for the protection of private property rights in Mis-
souri, the continuing legacy of the Commission, and the right-to-farm amend-
ment.  The court’s holding that the Commission’s regulations are valid allows 
for a regulatory taking to occur, effectively destroying the usefulness of the 
Breeders’ captive cervids and severely endangering the Breeders’ livelihoods.  
Furthermore, this holding allows the Commission to improperly usurp power 
from the MDA.  Finally, the court’s holding that the Breeders are not engaged 
in “farming and ranching practices”140 insinuates that Missouri’s right-to-farm 
amendment is an arbitrary provision that affords little, if any, protection to Mis-
souri’s agricultural community. 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 472–73. 
 135. Id. at 473. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 473–74. 
 140. Id. at 474. 
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A. Imbalance Between Private Interests and State Interests 
The Commission’s regulations at issue in Hill constitute a regulatory tak-
ing under the Takings Clause because they gravely inhibit the use of the Breed-
ers’ property without just compensation.  Although Missouri has a legitimate 
interest in containing the risk of CWD, the Commission’s regulations go too 
far, trampling on the private property rights of the Breeders.  The court’s deci-
sion to uphold the regulations will cause irreparable harm to the Breeders’ busi-
ness operations, including the potential for bankruptcy.  An interest in contain-
ing the spread of CWD should not require the court’s deference, especially 
where that specific interest is already covered by the regulations of another 
state agency – in this case the MDA.  The Breeders’ sufficiently demonstrated 
that the MDA’s regulations are adequate to contain the risk of CWD, therefore, 
the public policy argument in favor of the Commission’s regulations falls flat. 
In siding with the Commission, the court fails to acknowledge that the 
Commission’s regulations leave the Breeders with businesses that are no longer 
economically viable.  Nearly all the deer imported by the Breeders are used as 
hunting stock and killed on the Breeders’ preserves during the hunting sea-
son.141  The Breeders testified that although they breed deer to stock their hunt-
ing preserves, this is “not enough to sustain [their] operations” for the upcom-
ing season.142  The inability to keep up with demand will cause the Breeders to 
cancel scheduled hunts and return reservation fees paid in advance by custom-
ers.143  One of the Breeders attested that without being able to conduct business 
as usual during the hunting season, he will not have sufficient funds to repay 
his loans, effectively forcing his business into bankruptcy.144 
Both the Breeders and the Commission acknowledged that CWD is a dev-
astating illness that spreads rapidly and poses a significant risk to Missouri’s 
cervid population;145 however, the Commission failed to establish that their 
regulations specifically are necessary to effect a substantial public purpose.  
Given the degree of the Commission’s concern over this issue, it is unsettling 
that the Commission was “not aware” that the MDA was already taking signif-
icant regulatory measures to combat the spread of CWD.146  The Breeders pre-
 
 141. See Brief of Respondents at 19–20, Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 
S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (No. ED105042), 2017 WL 2345231, at *19–20. 
 142. Id. at 20. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 10. 
 146. See Hill v. Mo. Conservation Comm’n, No. 15OS-CC00005-01, 2016 WL 
8814770, at *6 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 17, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conser-
vation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).  One commissioner testified “that he 
was not aware of the [MDA]’s regulations regarding interstate movement of cervids 
into Missouri when he voted to approve the amended regulations being challenged in 
this case.”  Id. 
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sented ample evidence that the MDA’s CWD regulations and programs, certi-
fied by the USDA, were effective.147  Even the Commission’s experts testified 
that the MDA representatives managing the CWD herd-certification program 
were “very good scientists” and that “the USDA herd-certification program 
was based on good science and minimize[d] risk of transmission of CWD.”148   
No evidence exists to suggest that the Commission’s importation ban is neces-
sary to purport a substantial public purpose that the MDA’s herd-certification 
program is not already accomplishing.149  In fact, the Commission admits that 
it “did not anticipate there would be a mass mortality of white-tailed deer in 
Missouri . . . as a result of CWD.”150  Moreover, prior to the adoption of the 
Commission’s regulations, no additional cases of CWD were reported at pri-
vately owned deer farms or hunting preserves.151 
In its brief, the Commission argued that the regulations it attempts to im-
pose are the best way to prevent the spread of CWD and are an appropriate 
response to the issue and cited other states, such as Arkansas, that have imposed 
similar bans on importation.152  If an importation ban was the only effective 
method of stopping CWD, the Breeders would have a strong interest in sup-
porting the ban based on the risk CWD poses to their valuable herds.  It is clear 
from the Breeders stark opposition to Commission’s ban that it is not the only 
effective method of preventing CWD.  Instead, the harsh economic conse-
quences of the ban outweigh any marginal benefit over other methods of con-
taining the disease.  Even if an importation ban was necessary to stop the spread 
of the disease, the Commission does not have the authority to issue such a reg-
ulation.  Rather, the decision to implement a ban on the intra state movement 
of captive cervids rests in the hands of the MDA pursuant to the MLDCEL. 
B. Improper Regulatory Power 
In support of its authority to regulate the Breeders’ captive cervids, the 
Commission argues that “all cervids in Missouri are owned commonly by citi-
zens of the state and managed by the Missouri Department of Conservation, 
whether those cervids are free-ranging or are kept in privately owned breeding 
or hunting facilities.”153  Looking back to the enabling statute of the Commis-
sion, the relevant language are the words “game” and “wildlife resources of the 
state.”  These terms do not appear ambiguous; therefore, they can be taken at 
 
 147. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 141, at 57–58. 
 148. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *3. 
 149. Id. at *9. 
 150. Id. at *6. 
 151. Id. at *7. 
 152. Brief of Respondents, supra note 141, at 15. 
 153. Hill v. Mo. Conservation Comm’n, No. 15OS-CC00005-01, 2016 WL 
8814770, at *8 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 17, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conser-
vation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
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their plain and ordinary meaning.  Merriam-Webster defines “game” as “ani-
mals under pursuit or taken in hunting especially: wild animals hunted for sport 
or food”154 and “wildlife” as “living things and especially mammals, birds, and 
fishes that are neither human nor domesticated.”155  In Oak Creek Whitetail 
Ranch, LLC v. Lange,156 the court concluded that because the Breeders’ deer 
have never been in the wild, are penned and hand-fed, and cannot move freely 
beyond their confined area, the Breeders’ deer are domestic.  If Breeders’ cer-
vids are domestic rather than wild, they do not fall under the plain definition of 
game or wildlife.  Therefore, the Commission’s enabling statute does not ex-
tend authority over captive cervids as the Commission claims. 
Moreover, other regulations and practices clearly contradict the Commis-
sion’s assertion that it has authority over captive cervids.  One regulation re-
garding hunting preserves requires that fences should be maintained to “ex-
clude all hoofed wildlife of the state from becoming a part of the enterprise.”157  
This language suggests that the Commission distinguishes between “hoofed 
wildlife of the state” and the captive cervids held on hunting preserves.  State 
officials also recognize the Commission’s distinction between wild and captive 
deer.  An officer from the Howell County Sheriff’s Department remarked that 
“The Missouri Department of Conservation states that any Whitetail Deer 
bought by and maintained by a private big game hunting preserve is considered 
by them to be the same as a domestic animal so the deer in question is the sole 
property of [the hunting preserve owner].”158 
Despite these inconsistencies, in its analysis of whether the Commission 
has the regulatory authority necessary to promulgate the regulations in ques-
tion, the court stated that “the Commission’s regulations under article IV, sec-
tion 40(a)[] have always regulated captive deer and elk owned by private par-
ties.”159  This statement, however, is misleading.  Prior to the adoption of the 
regulations at issue in Hill, the Commission’s regulations as they related to 
“captive deer and elk owned by private parties” merely provided licensing re-
quirements for hunting preserve owners like the Breeders.160  While the MDA 
was granted the power to control the inter and intra state movement of captive 
cervids under the MLDCEL, the Commission has never been granted that 
power.161  Therefore, by issuing regulations inhibiting the importation of live 
cervids into the state, the Commission is usurping power reserved for the 
MDA.  Thus, it is inappropriate for the court to assume that because the Com-
mission regulates some aspects of captive cervid operations it is proper for the 
Commission to regulate the inter and intra state movement of captive cervids. 
 
 154. Game, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
 155. Wildlife, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
 156. 326 S.W.3d 549, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 157. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 3, § 10-9.565(1)(B) (2018). 
 158. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *9. 
 159. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 550 S.W.3d at 463, 471 (Mo. 2018) (en 
banc). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Hill, 2016 WL 8814770, at *3.  
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C. Implication of Arbitrariness 
When article I, section 35 was adopted into the Missouri Constitution, 
experts predicted that it would take judicial interpretation to fully understand 
the implications of the right-to-farm amendment.162  Previous litigation sur-
rounding the application of article I, section 35 to the cultivation of marijuana 
has provided little insight in the way of unpacking the protections of the provi-
sion.163  However, Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation provided the 
perfect opportunity for the court to offer a groundbreaking analysis of the right-
to-farm amendment.  Instead, in holding that the Breeders were not involved 
in the elusive “farming and ranching practices” purported to be protected by 
the amendment, the court left proponents of the right to farm disheartened and 
confused. 
Since its adoption, marijuana cultivators have been the only group to at-
tempt to use the right-to-farm amendment as a shield.164  In State v. Shanklin,165 
the Missouri Supreme Court held that the right-to-farm amendment did not 
preclude convictions for illegal marijuana cultivation.  In coming to this con-
clusion, the court found it instructive that the text of the amendment did nothing 
to suggest an intent to displace longstanding statutes making marijuana culti-
vation illegal.166  Despite holding that marijuana cultivation is not a farming or 
ranching practice, the Shanklin court did nothing more to define what does 
constitute a farming or ranching practice. 
Much like Shanklin, the court in Hill held that the Breeders are not en-
gaged in farming and ranching practices; but if breeding cervids does not count 
as farming or ranching, what does?  Merriam-Webster defines farming as “the 
practice of agriculture or aquaculture”167 and ranching as “to live or work on a 
ranch,” with ranch defined as “a large farm for raising horses, beef cattle, or 
sheep.”168  Although the dictionary excludes deer and elk from its definition of 
ranch, the day-to-day activities undertaken by ranchers who raise other domes-
tic animals are incredibly similar to the practices engaged in by the Breeders in 
Hill.  As discussed above, the court in Lange labeled the Breeders’ cervids as 
domestic animals meaning “[l]iving in or near the habitation of man; domesti-
cated; tame; as, domesticated animals.”169  Much like horses, cattle, and sheep, 
the Breeders’ cervids are born and bred in captivity where they remain for the 
 
 162. Husted, supra note 122. 
 163. Hill, 550 S.W.3d at 473. 
 164. See id. 
 165. 534 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 166. Id. at 242–43. 
 167. Farming, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
 168. Ranch, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). 
 169. Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, L.L.C. v. Lange, 326 S.W.3d 549, 550 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
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entirety of their lives.  The captive cervids are provided with feed and are con-
sidered docile and approachable.170  One of the Commission’s expert witnesses 
admitted that because of how the Breeders’ cervids are raised they are “reliant 
on humans for food and protection.”171  Given the close similarities between 
the Breeders’ practices and those of other domestic ranchers, it seems unlikely 
that even a cattle rancher is engaged in farming or ranching practices under the 
court’s interpretation. 
The Hill court, following Shanklin, concludes that “the voters [did not] 
intend[] to overthrow this longstanding regulatory pattern by adopting article 
I, section 35, when there is no language in this provision to suggest they did 
so.”172  However, unlike Shanklin, here it is unclear that the Commission’s reg-
ulations are actually part of a “longstanding regulatory pattern.”  In fact, the 
ban imposed is the first example of the Commission regulating the intra state 
movement of captive cervids.  This holding sets what seems to be an impossi-
bly high bar for protection under the right-to-farm amendment. 
Because the court still refuses to put a precise definition on farming and 
ranching practices, it is impossible to determine what, if anything, is protected 
by the right-to-farm amendment.  Perhaps a challenge brought by a cattle 
rancher inhibited from his business by a new statute separate from any 
longstanding statutory scheme will invoke the protection.  Only time and future 
challenges will tell. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation allowed public 
policy in favor of containing the spread of CWD to outweigh the risk of regu-
latory taking and an invalid extension of regulatory authority.  This decision 
will effectively lead to the destruction of captive cervid operations like those 
engaged in by the Breeders – although, this is a fact that did not seem to phase 
the court.  Despite MDA regulations already in place to fight CWD, the court 
acquiesced in the Commission’s usurpation of power from the MDA, approv-
ing the Commission’s regulations although they fell outside the scope of its 
regulatory authority.  Furthermore, the court’s holding regarding the right-to-
farm amendment insinuates that the provision has much less force than initially 
anticipated by voters.  It is unclear what kind of challenge it will take for the 
court to define the true meaning of the amendment.  Until the court interprets 
the reach of farming and ranching practices, Missourians will be left to wonder 




 170. Hill v. Mo. Conservation Comm’n, No. 15OS-CC00005-01, 2016 WL 
8814770, at *8 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 17, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Mo. Dep’t of Conser-
vation, 550 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
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 172. Hill, 550 S.W.3d at 473–74. 
19
Hunter: Endangering Missouri’s Captive Cervid Industry
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019


























Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/11
